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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF THE PREss-NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE

To

REFUSE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES IN CRIMINAL

TRIAL-Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S.Ct. 3200 (1976).
Early in the proceedings of the Charles Manson murder trial,1 the
trial judge issued an "Order re Publicity" prohibiting any attorney,
court employee, attach6, or witness from publicly disclosing any proposed trial evidence. During the trial, the attorneys of record received
the statement of a potential witness regarding a confession made by a
Manson codefendant. The confession implicated Manson in the TateLaBianca murders and revealed plans for the murders of several show
business personalities. 2 The court subsequently ruled that the statement was inadmissible as evidence. 3 William T. Farr, a reporter for
the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, thereafter obtained three copies of
4
this statement and published its contents.
Seven months later, after the trial had ended but while the case was
on appeal, the judge ordered Farr to disclose the identities of his
sources at a hearing convened to determine who had vi6lated the
"Order re Publicity."'5 Farr revealed that he had received the copies
from three separate sources, at least two of whom were attorneys in
the case, but he refused to disclose their identities because he had
promised confidentiality. Farr was held in contempt of court. The

1. People v. Manson, Crim. No. 253156 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Jan. 25, 1971).
2. The statement recited that Susan Atkins, a codefendant in the murder prosecution, had acknowledged the crimes for which she was being tried to Virginia Graham,

a potential witness. Miss Atkins implicated Manson and other codefendants in her detailed description of the multiple murders committed in the Tate and LaBianca households. The statement also revealed the defendants' plans to murder other show business
personalities at random while traveling across the country. For a description of the
"full and lurid details" of the confession published by Farr, see Farr v. Superior Court,
22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011

(1972).
3. See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct.
3200 (1976).
4. At the time Farr learned of the Graham statement, he was aware of the "Order
re Publicity." In soliciting copies of the statement, he promised to keep the identities

of his sources confidential. See Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 64, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 344 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
5. The trial judge did not cite Farr for contempt at the time the article was published. Indeed, prior to publication of the confession, the judge had expressly stated to
Farr in chambers that he could not "effectively order [him] to disclose the source"
because of the state's newsman-source privilege statute. Opening Brief for Appellant at
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state court of appeal upheld the citation; 6 the Supreme Court of California denied Farr's petition for a hearing; 7 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 8 Farr's subsequent petition for a
45-49, Farr v. Pitchess. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975). This shield statute, which has
since been amended to create a broader immunity, provided in pertinent part:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon
a newspaper . . . cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court, the Legislature, or
any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured for publication and published in a newspaper.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966), as amended, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West
Supp. 1976). The statute does not qualify the privilege it creates, and Farr believed that
it exempted him from any court order requiring disclosure of the source of his story.
When called to testify after the trial, Farr was no longer employed by the Herald
Examiner. The judge therefore concluded that Farr was no longer protected by the
statute. On appeal to the California court of appeal from the resultant contempt citation, Farr contended that the statute should not be narrowly interpreted to exclude him
from the scope of its immunity. The court, however, avoided the issue of construction
and held that the statute could not be applied to shield the reporter from a contempt
of court citation. Such an application, according to the court, would result in an unconstitu~tional legislative interference with the inherent power of the court to control its
own proceedings and officers. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 69, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 348 (197 1), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). Accord, Rosato v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 216-23, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 444-49 (1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976). See also Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d
1354 (N.M. 1976). The court thus denied Farr the privilege upon which he had relied
in obtaining the confidential information and publishing the article. Subsequently the
California court of appeal held that this did not constitute a denial of due process. In
re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
The decision is important in light of the United States Supreme Court's observation
that creation of a newsman's privilege is more appropriately a matter for the legislatures, rather than the courts, to determine. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
the plurality opinion noted that an exception to the denial of a testimonial privilege
does exist "for those persons protected by ... statutory privilege." Id. at 688. Accordingly, several commentators have urged that state legislators enact laws giving newsmen protection from forced disclosure of their news sources. See, e.g., Comment,
Branzburg, Caldwell and Pappas-A Quick Lateral Pass to Congress, 8 N. ENG. L.
REV. 336 (1973); Comment, 61 Ky. L.J. 551 (1973). Seventeen states have passed
newsman-source privilege statutes affording varying degrees of protection. For a listing
of these individual state statutes see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 689 n.27.
Yet, the Farr case illustrates how easily a state court may either circumvent or directly negate applicability of the statute. Other state courts have similarly denied the
intended effect of such statutes by narrowing their applicability to the point of ineffectuality. See, e.g., Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd, 266
Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); People ex rel.
Fischer v. Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973). In each case, the
court held that where a newsman personally observes the commission of a crime, the
newsman himself is the statutorily protected "source" of his information, whereas
the identity of those involved in criminal activity-despite their consent to the reporter's presence and volunteering of on-the-scene information-are part of the
"information" obtained and therefore not covered by the statute. The results of these
cases illustrate that the state legislatures alone cannot provide an adequate 1st amendment privilege for newsmen. It is the duty of the courts to encounter squarely the
issue by defining the extent of constitutional protection to be given the newsman.
6. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
7. See id.
8. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
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writ of habeas corpus was denied by the state court of appeal.9 Farr
then petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court, 10 claiming
that his incarceration violated the constitutional privilege of nondisclosure afforded a reporter by the first amendment." The district
court denied the petition, and Farr appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Held: The power and duty of the court to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial is a "compelling judicial interest which outweighs a news reporter's limited first amendment privilege to protect his news sources. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976).
Although interpreting prior case law to create a limited constitutional newsman's privilege, the Farr court did not adequately weigh
the appropriate competing interests in denying the reporter's privilege
to protect the confidentiality of his sources. This note will suggest that
the court's overreliance upon the fair trial interest and its failure to
analyze the newsman's testimonial privilege precluded the court from
effectively utilizing the balancing test it stated to be applicable. As will
be demonstrated, evaluation of the first amendment interest, when
weighed against the opposing need for disclosure, should have led to a
contrary decision in Farr.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Restraints on the Press

The first amendment forbids governmental abridgement of freedom
of speech or freedom of the press.' 2 The initial judicial confrontations
9. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
10. Farr filed the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which grants a
federal court jurisdiction to entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who, having exhausted the remedies available in the state courts,
claims he is in custody in violation of the.United States Constitution.
11. Appellant's brief raised four distinct constitutional grounds for relief. In addition to the 1st amendment challenge, Farr claimed that he was (a) deprived of a fair
trial because of the bias and prejudice of the state judge; (b) denied due process of
law because the judge misled and misinformed him as to the effect of an existing state
immunity statute, see note 5 supra; and (c) denied due process because the statute of
limitations had run regarding the prosecution of those who violated the court order
against publicity. 522 F.2d at 467 n.I. The court of appeals determined that these three
grounds had been adequately disposed of by the state court and properly avoided by
the federal district court. Id. For the state court's discussion of these issues see In re
Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
12.

"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press....

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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involving these freedoms reached the Supreme Court relatively late in
the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence. 13 Substantively, these
early cases primarily involved freedom of speech issues; the few cases
dealing independently with first amendment press protection focused
on attempts to censor publication by prior restraint.' 4 Beginning in
the 1960's, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly articulated a
broader function of the free press clause. 15 The Court has indicated
that, while the free speech clause guarantees the individual right to
13. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454 (1907). Justice Brennan explained the virtual nonexistence of Ist amendment cases in the first 125 years of the country's existence by observing:
[ I] n our frontier days not so much problems of individual liberty as problems of
the respective domains of federal and state power incident to territorial expansion
and economic growth came to the surface. Issues of individual liberty and the relationship of the citizen to his government waited in the wings pending the events
of this [20th] century that brought them to the fore.
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down city ordinance
that prohibited distribution of "circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any
kind" without first obtaining written permission from city); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (invalidating licensing requirement for publication of
pamphlets); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating injunctive remedies against "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" periodicals). In Grosjean the
Court stated:
[S] ince informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern ....
A free press stands as
one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it
to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
297 U.S. at 250.
15. The landmark decision expanding the focus of the free press clause was the
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New
York Times rule bars press liability for defamation of a public official absent proof
that the defamatory statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth. The "actual malice" requirement was justified by the
importance of a free and untrammeled press in serving the public interest of a robust
and wide-open debate on newsworthy issues. Thus, the Court recognized that freedom
of the press serves a broader function than guaranteeing freedom of speech to individual newspapermen. Subsequently the New York Times rule was extended to libel actions brought by public figures. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
More recently the Court has evidenced a reluctance to expand the rule to defamations
of private persons. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Nevertheless, the Court has struck down various challenges to press freedoms in the
1970's and has emphasized each time that the public has a right to be informed. See
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (broadcaster not liable in
"true" privacy action for truthfully publishing information released to public in official
court records); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidation of state statute imposing upon newspapers an obligation to grant "right of
reply"); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (executive branch
does not have inherent power to enjoin publication of excerpts from classified study,
despite national security interests at stake).
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freedom of expression, the free press clause encompasses the societal
right to a free flow of information. 16 Thus, the press has been given
explicit constitutional protection because of its vital role in transmitting to the public the information necessary for intelligent self-gov17
ernment.
Consistent with this perspective, the Court has continued to strike
down direct prior restraints on publication as impermissible intrusions
on a free press.' 8 In addition, the Court has recently addressed the
constitutionality of indirect restraints on the press which arise from

governmental action impairing a newsman's ability to gather informa16. "The Constitution specifically selected the press... to play an important role
in the discussion of public affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). In
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court stated:
The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings
arising from the prosecutions... are without question events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to
report the operations of government.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added). For a general discussion of the fundamental distinction
between individual rights and societal rights protected by the first amendment see
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting in
part). See also Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (1974), quoted in Barth, Background Paper, in RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 41, 104

(1976) (Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Justice, Publicity, and
the First Amendment), where Justice Stewart asserts that the free press clause is in
essence a "structural" provision of the Constitution.
17. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (government-enforced right of access would intrude into the function of newspapers to
disseminate, without impediment, information and commentary to the public); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring;
"without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people"). See also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and note 15 supra.
18. When confronted with prior restraints, the Court has imposed a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity. The burden of overcoming this presumption has thus far proved insurmountable. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Most recently, the Court invalidated
a Nebraska supreme court gag order which forbade the press from reporting any facts
"strongly implicative" of the accused in a sensational murder trial; the state did not
meet its heavy burden imposed as a prerequisite to securing the valid restraint. See
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
The Court has also struck down efforts to hold the press in contempt of court for
publications which interfere with the administration ofjustice absent a compelling need
for restraint. See Craig v. Harey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Cf. Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375 (1962). In Pennekamp, the Court reversed contempt convictions of news
publishers for criticizing the partisanship of circuit judges in nonjury proceedings and
reaffirmed its stand, saying, 'This essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion [is] consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be
allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order." 328 U.S. at
334. In Craig, which also involved a newspaper's critical commentary on matters pending before the judge, the Court stated that in order to justify a contempt citation of
the press, the danger posed by the publication to the judicial process "must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." 331 U.S. at 376.
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tion. 19 In Branzburg v. Hayes,20 the Court confronted the indirect restraint of requiring reporters to disclose their news sources. The
Branzburg decision involved three cases in which reporters declined to
answer questions before grand juries on the ground that the confiden21
tiality of their sources was protected by the freedom of press clause.

Placing primary emphasis on the grand jury's role of investigating illegal activity, the Court ruled that the overriding need to compel the
testimony of all persons justified the "incidental burden" on first
amendment rights. 22 In reaching its decision, however, the Branzburg

Court failed to indicate clearly either the existence of a newsman's

19. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (denial of reporter's constitutional right to interview federal prison inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974) (denial of reporter's constitutional right to interview state prison inmates); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (denial of newsman's privilege to
refuse disclosure of confidential sources to grand jury).
20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court faced the issue for the first time.
In fact, the 1st amendment had not been argued as the basis for a privilege to keep
sources confidential until 1958. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). No such testimonial privilege was recognized at common law. See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra at 685-86. The premise for this common law
rule, however, was that the interest of the news reporter is private and must yield to
the superior public interest in law administration. See, e.g., In re Goodfader's Appeal,
45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961). The foundations for this premise were uprooted
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which emphasized the importance of a free press in light of the public interest in the free flow of news. See
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," in 1964 THE SUPREME COURT REViEW 191 (P. Kurland ed. 1964). Following the New York Times decision, advocacy of a constitutionally protected newsman's privilege increased. See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Note, Reporters
and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE
L.J. 317 (1970).
21. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) (refusal to turn over
notes and tape recordings of interviews given by officers of Black Panther Party concerning their aims and activities); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971)
(refusal to disclose identity of drug users whom reporter viewed and photographed
synthesizing hashish from marijuana); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297
(1971) (refusal to name persons or relate activities observed by reporter inside Black
Panther Party headquarters during civil disorders).
22. The Court emphasized that the sole issue before it was the obligation of reporters to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of a
crime. 408 U.S. at 682. It further stated:
[T] hese cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or
restriction on what the press may publish, . . . and no penalty, civil or criminal,
related to the content of published material ....
No attempt is made to require
the press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them
on request.
Id. at 681-82. Thus, the Court affirmed the state court decisions in Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), and In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971),
and reversed the grant of privilege in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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privilege under the first amendment or, if the privilege exists, the
23
scope of that privilege.
The uncertainty of Branzburg has led to varying interpretations in
the state and federal courts in subsequent cases where reporters have
claimed the privilege in other contexts. 24 Farris important for recognizing that a newsman's testimonial privilege is rooted in the first
amendment. On the facts of thg case, however, the court found the
trial judge's duty to protect the sixth amendment rights of the defendants to be a conflicting interest so compelling as to override the privilege.
23. One major source of the confusion emanating from Branzburg is the lack of a
majority opinion. Justice White wrote for a plurality of four and Justice Powell's concurrence was necessary to make a 5-4 majority. Powell's concurring opinion asserted
that each case involving the journalist's privilege would require a balancing of the
opposing interests. He warned against too broad a reading of the Branzburg opinion:
'The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury,
are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." 408 U.S. at 709. Three of the dissenters also believed that a partial
privilege should exist, while Justice Douglas favored an absolute privilege. Therefore,
a majority of the justices in Branzburg favored at least a qualified 1st amendment privilege for reporters. See generally Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HAST. L.J. 709,715-19 (1975).
The plurality opinion did acknowledge that news gathering merited some 1st amendment protection, for "without some protection for seeking out news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681. This was in line with the Court's past
recognition of "the most constructive purposes" that anonymity may fulfill in protecting first amendment rights: it enables individuals to disseminate ideas and information
without public identification and the fear of reprisal. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
65 (1960). Nevertheless, the uncertainty of Branzburg is compounded by Justice White's
use of fluctuating criteria. He initially indicated that the press must overcome a
presumption against any claimed testimonial privilege. 408 U.S. at 686. Subsequently,
however, he reverted to the traditional "compelling state interest" test, under which
the presumption in favor of a 1st amendment right must be overcome: the government
had shown, in each case, "'a substantial relation between the information sought and
a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.'" Id. at 700, quoting Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
24. In the post-Branzburg era, some state courts have held flatly that there is no
journalist's privilege and thus have declined to apply a balancing test. See, e.g., Dow
Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 303 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1973) (civil action for libel);
In re Bridge, 120 NJ. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991
(1973) (grand jury proceeding); People ex rel. Fischer v. Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687,
342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973) (grand jury). Most courts, however, have cited Branzburg
in support of a partial constitutional privilege and have balanced the privilege against
the opposing interest. See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(criminal trial); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973) (civil action); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1972) (grand jury proceeding); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (civil action); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,
124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976) (criminal trial). Cf.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F.Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (granting injunctive
relief against attempt to search newspaper premises). For decisions granting a testimonial privilege in criminal trial situations see cases cited in note 31 infra.

1011

Washington Law Review
B.

Vol. 51: 1005, 1976

Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial

In Farrv. Pitchess the newsman's privilege arose in the context of a
criminal trial. The Supreme Court has established that the accused in
a state criminal prosecution is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences. 25 In Sheppard v. Maxwell 6 the Court
enunciated specific guidelines for protecting the defendant's constitu-

tional right to a fair trial; it focused sharply on the duty of trial courts
to guard against the impact of adverse publicity by exercising control
27
over court officers and other persons under their jurisdiction.

After Branzburg, lower courts began confronting cases in which a
reporter's asserted privilege to refuse disclosure of his news sources

was in potential conflict with the defendant's right to a fair trial. Each
of these courts has cited Branzburg to support the proposition that

there exists a partial constitutional privilege which necessitates a caseby-case balancing of the opposing interests. 2 8 In United States v. Lid25. The 6th amendment guarantees trial by an impartial jury in federal criminal
prosecutions. Because "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice," the due process clause of the 14th amendment guarantees this same
right to a defendant in a state criminal prosecution. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
26. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
27. In Sheppard, the Court recommended procedures which would limit the sources
of the newsman's information rather than place direct limitations on what the newsman may publicize. The courts must therefore strive to enforce fairness in the proceedings by exercising their powers over those under their immediate control, i.e., those
involved in the litigation: parties to the action, attorneys, witnesses, court employees,
and enforcement officers. Collaboration between counsel and press is "worthy of disciplinary measures;" yet the judge may impose such discipline only upon those under his
immediate control. 384 U.S. at 363. Additional remedies against prejudicial publicity
include continuance of the case, change of venue to another county not so permeated
with publicity, and sequestration of the jury. Id.
The Sheppard case is a classic example of overwhelming prejudicial publicity and
the lack of judicial control over a courtroom. During the trial, newsmen were allowed
to hound the accused, sit in close proximity to the jury and counsel, and freely photograph and televise during recesses. In addition, the prosecution made available to the
media much evidence that was clearly inadmissible at trial. Sheppard, however, was
not a novelty. The Court had previously overturned criminal convictions in which the
publicity surrounding the trial was so intensive that it constituted an "inherent denial"
of defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)
(extensive televising and taping of courtroom procedures); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963) (televising of defendant confessing to a crime); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961) (widely publicized pretrial press releases on defendant's confession to
a number of murders). See generally Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1971); Warren
& Abell, Free Press-FairTrial: The "Gag Order," A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 51 (1972); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal Trials, 10 HARV. CiV.
RiGHTS--Civ. LIB. L. REv. 608 (1975).

28. In effect, the courts were adopting the balancing test suggested by Justice
Powell in his Branzburgconcurrence. See note 23 supra.
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dy, 2 9

the defendant demanded disclosure of a reporter's confidential
source for the purpose of impeaching a governmental witness. The
court, convinced of the compelling need for disclosure, extended the
Branzburg holding to a criminal trial situation by striking a balance in
favor of the fair trial interest. 3 0 In contrast to Liddy, three recent decisions have relied upon Branzburg to uphold the newsman's privilege
31
after balancing the conflicting interests.
II.

THE FARR DECISION: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

FirstAmendment Privilege

1.

Recognition by the Farr court

The Farr court also interpreted Branzburg as creating a constitutional newsman's privilege, albeit a partial one. The court stated: "It is
clear that Branzburg recognizes some First Amendment protection of
news sources ... [although] the privilege is a limited or conditional
one."'32 It then explicitly embraced the methodology that was recom-'
mended by Justice Powell in his Branzburg concurrence and utilized
in a number of post-Branzburgdecisions: 33
The application of the Branzburg holding to non-grand jury cases
seems to require that the claimed First Amendment privilege and the
29. 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
30. The court of appeals thus affirmed the decision of the district court, which had
stated: "Where Branzburg denied a [newsman's] privilege in favor of the public interest in law enforcement, this Court denies a privilege in favor of the rights of an accused to a fair trial." United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 215 (D.D.C. 1972).
The added significance of extending the Branzburg holding is that, whereas the identities of the reporter's sources remain confidential when disclosed before a grand jury,
see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972), the names become a matter of
public record when divulged during a court proceeding. This extension was noted by
the Liddy court of appeals. 478 F.2d at 587. Accordingly, the court directed that the
information be released "solely to counsel in camera" until the trial judge ascertained
a definite need for public-trial disclosur. Id. at 588.
31. Ufiited States v. Calvert, No. 74-107 (E.D. Mo. April 26, 1974); State v. St.
Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). In each of the cases, a reporter was
subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case where pretrial publicity was at issue. Each
court quashed the subpoena directed at the reporter because there was no showing
that the information sought was sufficiently material to the issue of defendant's guilt
or innocence. Underlying all of these decisions without explicit recognition is the
premise that if every pretrial story resulted in a subpoena, pretrial reporting might be
discontinued. Goodale, supra note 23, at 732.
1 32. 522 F.2d at 467.
33. Id. at 468. See notes 23 & 28 supra.
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opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where lies the paramount interest.

An examination of the court's opinion, however, does not reveal
that the balancing was in fact conducted. Instead, the court, after setting forth the duties and obligations of the trial judge, concluded that
the district court had considered the factual situation and had struck
an appropriate balance. In so holding, the Farr court avoided employing the first amendment criteria which it had enumerated three
years earlier.
2.

The methodologicalfailure

Farr's claim was not spurious. His situation illustrates the operation
of indirect restraints on the press: had he complied with the courtordered disclosure, he would likely have experienced a "drying up"
of his sources because he could no longer guarantee their confidentiality.3 4 Although the court recognized the existence of a newsman's
privilege and thus impliedly acknowledged this reality, its approach
and its lack of analysis fail to consider the importance of first amendment freedoms traditionally recognized by courts and neglect to recognize the Ninth Circuit court's own prior articulation of these precepts.
In Bursey v. United States,35 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit confronted the issue of whether the first amendment protects
34. The informative value of the sensationalist story Farr published is questionable.
Undoubtedly shocking to a number of its readers, the article contributed little to intelligent self-government. The informative value of a news story, however, is a judgment
"better left to experienced news editors than to judges versed in a quite different discipline." Barth, supra note 16, at 96. The press itself must decide what should be printed.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state's "right of reply" law). Moreover, the constitutional basis of a newsman's privilege is not grounded upon merely the value of the particular undisclosed
source or the information obtained therefrom. Rather, it derives from the inhibiting
effect that forced disclosure has upon the journalist's ability to continue confidential
source relationships. See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
Lest the reader consider Farr an irresponsible member of the press corps, it should
be pointed out that he had an excellent reputation for his accurate and discerning news
coverage throughout the Manson trial. V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER 539
(1975).
35. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). Brenda Joyce Presley and Sherrie Bursey, reporters for the Black Panther newspaper, were subpoenaed by a grand jury to be
questioned about the paper, meetings of the Panthers, and a speech by David Hilliard,
Chief of Staff of the Black Panther Party, threatening President Nixon, which had been
reported in the Black Panther. The reporters refused to answer inquiries relating to
information received in confidence or relating to management of the paper.

1014

Newsman's Privilege
grand jury witnesses from disclosing the identity of co-workers on a
newspaper. Although the case presented a factual setting somewhat
analogous to that in Branzburg, the court distinguished Bursey because it did not involve news gathering. 36 But more importantly in the
present context, the Bursey court read Branzburg as creating a qualified newsman's privilege and concluded that its own methodology was
37
not impaired by the Supreme Court's decision.
In addressing the first amendment assertions in Bursey, the court
carefully articulated a two-step process to determine if the witnesses
could be compelled to answer questions before the grand jury. First, it
recognized the favored status afforded to first amendment protections
and concluded that the government was unable to rebut their applicability.3 8 Second, the court imposed a burden on the government to
demonstrate a legitimate and compelling interest to justify the incidental infringement of first amendment rights. This took the form of a
two-pronged test:3 9 the government must establish an "immediate,
substantial, and subordinating" interest in the information as well as a
"substantial connection" between the information sought and the governmental interest. 40 In applying this test, the court traced at length
the significance of first amendment protections and concluded that
compelled disclosure of newsmen's identities would constitute an impermissible chilling effect on first amendment rights, especially
freedom of the press. 41
36. Id. at 1090.
37. Id. at 1091. The court issued its decision in Bursey one day after the Branzburg decision, but clearly without consideration of the Supreme Court's decision. In
denying the Government's petition for rehearing, the court harmonized its holding
with Branzburg. It found the concurring opinion of Justice Powell to be a reinforcement of its own view of the limited reach of the plurality's rationale. Id. at 1091 n.2.
38. The court stated: "All speech, press, and associational relationships are presumptively protected by the First Amendment; the burden rests on the Government
to establish that the particular expressions or relationships are outside its reach." Id. at
1082.
39. The test was actually three-pronged. The third prong was "that the means of
obtaining the information is not more drastic than necessary to forward the asserted
governmental interest." Id. at 1083. This prong has applicability, however, mainly in
the context of a grand jury proceeding where information is being sought by the government. The trial judge's order in Farr, in any event, was proper under this third
prong, because all available means to obtain the needed information had been exhausted. For this reason, only the first two prongs of the test are analyzed in the text.
40. Id.
41. The court emphasized that the basic purpose of the free press clause is to
guarantee public access to information. It stated that the right to decide what to print,
to distribute what is printed, and to preserve the anonymity of those involved are fundamental elements of press freedom. Questions probing the publication and distribution of the Panthers' newspaper and pamphlets "cut deeply into press freedom." Id. at
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The Bursey methodology stands in stark contrast to the summary
treatment of first amendment considerations in Farr. The link suggested between Branzburg and Bursey in the latter case should have
led the Farr court to use its previous methodology. Instead, the Farr
court failed to address the chilling effect on first amendment protections and the historical importance of such rights in a free society. In
effect, the Ninth Circuit court seems to have adopted precisely the
position that it condemned in Bursey, when it stated that the mere
recognition of legitimate government interests "does not automatically
override First Amendment rights, and their invocation does not alone
carry the Government's burden . . *..42 Indeed, the Farr court's entire approach suggests that it applied a presumption against the
claimed first amendment privilege and thus abandoned the stand it
43
had taken three years earlier.
B.

The CountervailingNeed for Disclosure

In conducting its balancing test, the Farrcourt not only avoided the
approach of Bursey, but failed to analyze properly the opposing need
for disclosure. According to the court, Farr's refusal to disclose the
identity of his news sources constituted a "direct challenge to the
power and duty of the court to protect its processes and to guarantee
due process to the accused person. 4 4 This phrase signifies two pur1084. Therefore, the reporters were entitled to refuse disclosure of the newspaper's
writers, publishers, printers and distributors. Id. at 1083-88.
In addition, the court found a compelling need to disclose the identity of high level
party officials and their contacts with foreign governments because of the governmental
interest in protecting the President and uncovering possible plots with foreign governments. The reporters were not, however, required to answer questions regarding the
overseas travels and funding of the Panthers. Id. at 1087-88.
42. Id. at 1086. Although the Farr opinion neither employed nor acknowledged
the Bursey methodology, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia quoted
and utilized it in United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Equally puzzling was appellant Farr's failure even to mention Bursey in his brief.
Although the particular aspect of press freedom before the court in Bursey was the
operation of a news medium rather than news gathering, the Liddy opinion illustrates
how the Bursey methodology fully applies to a newsman's protection of his confidential sources. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
43. The ultimate effect of the Farrdecision could be a limitation of Bursey's application to only those cases involving the freedom to withhold information about one's
political beliefs and associations in the grand jury context. It has been stated that this
was in fact its limited holding. See Note, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 867, 881 (1973). Clearly,
however, the court in Bursey was deeply concerned with the protection of confidential
press relationships from governmental intrusion. See note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
44. 522 F.2d at 468.
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poses of the contempt order issued against Farr: (1) to prevent conduct designed to frustrate the court's attempt to guarantee a fair trial,
and (2) to compel obedience of a lawful court order. The court, however, discussed only the former. Analysis of the court's arguments indicates that the stated explanation for compelling disclosure was inapposite and that the suggested but unexplored reason constitutes a
bootstrap approach to overcome first amendmerit protections.
1.

Defendant's right to afair trial

Quoting extensively from Sheppard v. Maxwell,45 the court in Farr
declared that the trial judge had taken "[t] he most practical and recommended procedure to insure against dissemination of prejudicial
information. '46 The court, assuming that Farr's refusal to disclose the
identity of his sources, in violation of a court order, ipso facto threatened the defendants' right to a fair trial, then stated: "That constitutional right cannot be so protected if the authority of the court to enforce its orders is diluted. '47 Therefore, the court concluded, the
newsman's privilege must yield to the more important and compelling
need for disclosure.
The publication of Farr's article, however, did not interfere with
the Manson defendants' right to a fair trial because it did not have any
prejudicial effect on the jury. The jury was effectively sequestered for
the duration of the trial.48 In contrast to the "bedlam" dominating the
Sheppard trial,49 the judge in the Manson trial exercised careful control over the courtroom environment. 50 There was no indication that
press activity interfered with the jury's deliberative process; the trial
45.

384 U.S. 333 (1966). See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.

46.
47.

522 F.2d at 468.
Id. at 469 (emphasis added).

48. The Sheppard Court suggested sequestration of the jury as an effective device
to control the threat to fair trial. 384 U.S. at 363. In fact, trial judges overwhelmingly
report that jury sequestration operates as a very effective insulation from prejudicial
publicity. Siebert, Trial Judges' Opinions on Prejudicial Publicity, in FREE PRESS AND
FAIR TRIAL 1, 11 (C. Bush ed. 1970). The Manson murder case has been cited as a
good example of how sequestration of the jury successfully shields jurors from what

appears in the media. See Warren & Abell, Free Press-FairTrial: The "Gag Order,"
A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. Rv.51, 97 (1972).

49. See note 27 supra.
50. For example, prior to publication of Farr's'article, the windows on the bus
used to transport the jurors were blacked out so that they could not see the story headline on the newsstands. For other examples of the precautionary steps taken by the trial
judge see V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER 439-44, 608-09 (1975).
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court never took the position that publication of the article had any
adverse impact on the defendants' right to a fair trial. 5 1 Yet the Farr
opinion failed to specifically address appellant's argument 52 and Justice Douglas' suggestion 53 that Sheppard had no applicability to the
case at bar.
Secondly, the court did not adequately distinguish the purpose of
the "Order re Publicity" (to control dissemination of prejudicial information) from the purpose of the order directed at Farr (to compel
disclosure of confidential sources). The necessity for the original publicity order had terminated by the time the order of contempt was
issued. When the contempt citation was issued, the trial was over; 54 the
need to protect the defendants' right to a fair trial, as traditionally
conceptualized by American courts, 55 had ceased. Any response that
Farr might have given to the order that he disclose the identities of his
sources would have had no impact on the Manson defendants' right to
a fair trial. 5 6 Thus, Farr's situation was not analogous to those in
Branzburg and Liddy, both of which involved the pursuit of information to aid ongoing investigations.
Moreover, the Farr court failed to indicate clearly that disciplinary
measures could not be imposed directly upon Farr for violation of the
original "Order re Publicity." That order had been directed only to
attorneys, court employees, and witnesses; it was not a gag order di51. Reply Brief for Appellant at 8, Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. Opening Brief for Appellant at 14, Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1975).
53. In granting Farr's release from jail pending the decision of the Ninth Circuit,
Circuit Justice Douglas observed: "[I] n the present case the Manson jury was sequestered and so not subject to the kind of influence we condemned in Sheppard v. Maxwell." 409 U.S. 1243, 1246 (1973).
54. The jury verdict had been entered one month earlier.
55. When courts have spoken of a fair trial, they have generally referred to one
proceeding in the presence of one set of jurors. The possibility of retrial with a new
set of jurors who have been exposed to the published news story in issue in a given
situation has generally not been deemed so important as to have significant weight in
the balancing process. The possibility of change of venue or a continuance has been
suggested as a preventive measure for future trials. As one court put it: "Enforced
silence in the name of preserving the sterility of a future trial can suffocate the First
Amendment .... United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. Although the Manson defendants' trial was over at the time of the contempt
order, the trial judge may have hoped to protect future defendants' right to fair trial
by punishing Farr in order to dissuade future news reporters from publishing similarly
obtained material. Such a consideration, however, is not one to be balanced in weighing the 1st amendment protections against-the present defendants' right to a fair trial.
The 6th amendment right is personal to the person then on trial. In each instance.
the balancing process should be done by comparing the interests to determine if. in
the proceedings then before the trial judge, the publicity threatens the fairness of the
ongoing trial.
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rected at the press. By validating the contempt order, however, the
circuit court allowed the trial judge to expand the jurisdiction of that
order to any newsman covering the case. In so doing, the court indirectly allowed precisely the limitations that the Sheppard Court had
deplored 57 and validated the mechanism which the author of the
58
Sheppard opinion had personally repudiated.
2.

Enforcement of a lawful court order

Since the fair trial issue in Farrdid not compel the use of contempt
power, the question remaining is whether the preservation of judicial
authority constitutes a viable interest in itself that establishes the requisite compelling need for disclosure. 59 Although the Farrcourt failed
to segregate the fair trial and judicial enforcement issues, it did acknowledge a "compelling judicial interest in disclosure of the identity
of those persons frustrating a duly entered order of the court." 6 0 Thus,
57. The Sheppard Court held that a court can impose restrictions on the release 6f
information to the press only upon those within the court's jurisdiction. It expressly
stated that it was unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally
exercised by the news media. See 384 U.S. at 350. In addition, none of the three studies
undertaken subsequent to the Sheppard decision recommends any restrictions on the
press. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, in Reardon, The Fair
Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 347 (April 1968) (Reardon Report);
Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968)
(Kaufman Report); THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967) (Medina Report). The Kaufman Report expressly

states: "The Committee does not presently recommend any direct curb or restraint on
publication by the press of potentially prejudiced material. Such a curb, it feels, is
both unwise as a matter of policy and poses serious constitutional problems." 45 F.R.D.
at 401-02 (footnote omitted).
58. Justice Clark, author of the majority opinion in Sheppard, made an unusual
departure from the Court's policy of silence in order to respond to a charge that the
Sheppard decision was an invitation to judges to use their contempt powers against the
press. Appearing before a conference of state trial judges, he stated:
[T] he Court never held up contempt and maybe never will [because such action]
may be too stringent.... I'm not proposing that you jerk a newspaper reporter in

the courtroom and hold him in contempt. We do not have to jeopardize freedom
of the press. The press has made sure our democracy works as it should.
A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 245 (1967) (bracketed phrase

supplied by the authors).
59. Judicial authority is preserved through the inherent power of the courts to
punish for contempt when their integrity or respectability is threatened. See Shillitani
v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949); United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

60.

522 F.2d at 468.
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the issue is whether prosecution of persons who have violated a court
order justifies coercing a news reporter to reveal confidential sources.
In obtaining copies of the alleged confession, Farr witnessed the
wilful disobedience of a lawful court order. Therefore, the Farrcourt
decision would appear to be consistent with the position of the Branzburg plurality that a reporter may not invoke the testimonial privilege
when the news source itself is involved in criminal conduct. 6 1 A
number of considerations, however, militate against such a narrow
reading of Branzburg.
First, the magnitude of the criminal offenses involved in Farrdid
not approach the concerns that prompted the Branzburg decision. In
Branzburg, revelations of the identities of the reporters' confidential
sources would have aided the government in eliminating illegal drug
traffic, preventing assassination attempts, and protecting the community from violent disorders. 62 The investigations involved felonious
conduct in violation of state and federal criminal statutes. In contrast,
the Farrcourt was concerned with the violation of a judge-made order
of limited duration, a misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty
was five hundred dollars and five days in jail. 63 The judicial interest in
64
Farrwas not as compelling as the state interest in Branzburg.
61. The Court in Bran zburg stated: "Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury's task need they or
the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas." 408 U.S. at 691. Accordingly,
post-Branzburg decisions have ruled in favor of disclosure when the source itself is
implicated in a crime. See Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974);
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972); People ex rel. Fischer v.
Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973).
62. 408 U.S. at 701.
63. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1218 (West 1972).
64. Farr was cited for civil rather than criminal contempt, because the sentence
was not punitive but coercive in nature; he could have "purged" himself at any time
by complying with the court order. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Farr was ordered incarcerated until he complied with the court's
order to disclose the specific identities of his sources. In a petition for habeas corpus in
the state court of appeals, Farr argued that the order imposed "an indeterminate sentence" and a "life term." In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653
(1974). The court acknowledged the "special problem" with coercive incarceration
when disobedience of the court order is based on an "articulated moral principle:" "In
such a situation, it is necessary to determine the point at which the commitment ceases
to serve its coercive purpose and becomes punitive in character. When that point is
reached ....
[duration of the incarceration] is limited by the five day maximum sentence provided ..... Id. at 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 653. The case was remanded to the
superior court, which found that Farr was unlikely ever to comply with the order and
that any further incarceration would be penal in nature. He was therefore released
from custody.
Nevertheless, the punishment which Farr received for refusing to disclose his sources
of information was wholly disproportionate to the penalty imposed for violation of the
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Furthermore, the link between the newsman's source and some
criminal conduct should not automatically invalidate the claim to a
testimonial privilege. Justice Powell in his Branzburg concurrence indicated that a newsman should be required to respond only when the
information he possesses directly relates to a legitimate need of law
65
enforcement that outweighs the constitutional interests of the press.
Therefore, the mere connection of the source to criminal activity
should not constitute the sole ground for denying a newsman's privilege. Had the court actually utilized the Powell case-by-case balancing
approach, the Farrdecision might have come out differently.
Nor did the court acknowledge the need to distinguish the source of
the criminal sanctions directed at the reporters in Branzburg and Farr.
As indicated above, the Branzburg cases involved attempts to further
investigations of violations of legislatively established crimes. On the
other hand, the contempt citation in Farrattempted to enforce a judgemade order to limit publicity. Although the preservation of courtroom discipline may require a credible contempt power, it does not
give a court carte blanche authority to impose contempt citations
upon persons outside its jurisdiction. 66
C.

The Chilling Effect of the Farr Decision

Although a court is not allowed to impose a gag order directly upon
the press, according to Farrit may hold a reporter in contempt for not
disclosing his sources after publication. The decision infringes substantially on freedom of the press. First, forced disclosure in a case
like Farr's inhibits journalists from establishing or continuing confidential source relationships. Since reporters' sources tend to "dry up"
when they cannot be promised confidentiality, the increased practice
of issuing subpoenas to members of the press effectively impairs the
67
gathering of valuable news from these sources.
court's publicity order. Farr was imprisoned for 45 days, the longest term yet served in
United States history by a reporter for defying a court order. See id., 111 Cal. Rptr. at
653. Thus, a news reporter asserting a 1st amendment privilege was punished more
severely for not disclosing information pertinent to an order to which he was not subject, than the actual violators of the order (who could not have asserted such a privilege) could have been punished under the maximum sentence.
65. 408 U.S. at 710.
66. See notes 57-58 supra.
67. One legal commentator has concluded from his empirical survey, "[T] he practice of subpoenaing reporters has, in several instances, had a significant detrimental
effect on the quality of news coverage." Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:An Empirical
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Even if the reporter is able to maintain his sources, the court's contempt power may be intimidating. Promises of confidentiality are so
essential to maintaining avenues of news gathering that most reporters
would go to jail before disclosing the identities of those sources.6 8
Therefore, the court's power to impose burdensome contempt sentences on the reporter seriously encroaches upon his freedom to publish the information without fear of incarceration. To the extent that it
discourages publication of news gathered, the post-publication penalty
has the effect of a prior restraint with its inevitable chilling effect
upon future news reporting. 69 As a result, the demarcation between
Study, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 229, 270 (1971). The exhaustive survey reveals that the
average newsman relies on "regular" confidential sources in 22.2% of his stories and
on first-time confidential sources in 12.2% of his stories. Id. at 247. The recent barrage
of subpoenas has interfered with reporting efforts in a variety of ways, including: (1)
the introduction of a guarded and withdrawn attitude among sources which precludes
the possibility of in-depth, interpretive coverage; (2) a great increase in time and effort
required to get a confidential story; and (3) the ultimate form of impairment-a
source's flat refusal to give the reporter certain information, or even to grant an interview, for fear of exposure when the reporter is subpoenaed. Id. at 265-68. See also
Guest & Stanzler, supra note 20; Goodale, supra note 23; Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV. 829 (1974).
Several instances have already been documented where, following the Branzburg
decision, stories were cancelled because the news agencies could not guarantee confidentiality: (1) the Louisville Courier-Journalcancelled further stories about drug abuse
because of the Branzburg subpoena; (2) CBS News had to cancel an interview it had
arranged with a woman who had been willing to disclose how she cheated on welfare,
provided that her identity remained secret; (3) informants' fears that their reportercontacts would be subpoenaed precluded both the Boston Globe and the Baton Rouge
State-Titnes from pursuing their respective investigations of official corruption; (4)
ABC News was forced to turn down an opportunity to conduct filmed interviews inside Black Panther Party headquarters in Oakland, California. Comment, Newsmen's
Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy,
49 TUL. L. REV. 417, 421-22 n.41, citing The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, Press Censorship Newsletter No. I, at 5-6 (Mar./Apr. 1973).
These incidents illustrate how forced disclosure of confidential sources affects the
quality of news coverage. See Murasky, supra at 856-66. The situation has not improved; since Branzburg, there has been a sharp rise in the number of subpoenas requiring reporters to reveal sources in criminal proceedings. See Barth, supra note 16,
at 47-48.
68. Blasi, supra note 67, at 276-77; Gordon, The Confidences Newsmen Must Keep,
10 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 15, 17 (Nov./Dec. 1971). Gordon asserts that, since
1848, newsmen have revealed the identity of a confidential source in only four of some
eighty cases. Id. The importance of maintaining confidential source relationships is
exemplified in a rule promulgated by the American Newspaper Guild in its code of
ethics: "[N] ewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies ....
"
Brandenburg, The Guild's Code of Ethics, in THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 567 (G.
Bird & F. Merwin eds. 1942).
69. One indication of this chilling effect is the generation of a kind of "self-censorship," which the Supreme Court has in the past deplored as an impermissible invasion
of 1st amendment freedoms. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
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direct prior restraints and indirect restraints becomes blurred.7 0
Ironically, the Farrtype of indirect restraint may operate more invidiously than a directly imposed gag order. If a publicity order is issued in a criminal trial, a reporter in Farr's position can justifiably
conclude that its effect may be judicially extended to him as well as to
those within the court's jurisdiction. Yet, the newsman does not have
standing to challenge such an order because, on its face, he is not affected. 7 1 This presents the anomalous situation where a news reporter
72
can immediately appeal a gag order imposed directly on the press
but is unable to challenge a court order which nevertheless may operate as a prior restraint. Thus, the reporter is left with the unhappy
choice of curtailing news gathering to conform with the publicity
order or risking contempt by challenging the order's efficacy.
III.

CONCLUSION

The inherent contempt power provides a court with a powerful tool
to enforce conduct in the courtroom. In addition, as indicated in Farr
v. Pitchess, that power can extend beyond the courtroom and in fact
amount to a potential infringement of a constitutionally protected
right. Whenever such infringement involves press freedoms, a court
must be keenly sensitive to the compelling interests underlying a free
70. In light of the textual discussion, the claim of the Branzburg plurality that disclosure of news sources is not related to restrictions on publication is questionable.
See note 22 supra.
71. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 208, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427, 438 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976). Confronted with a factual situation similar to that in Farr,the court responded to the reporters' contention that a protective order precluding court officers from disclosing pretrial testimony for public
dissemination was invalid:
This argument misconceives the nature of the orders and the standing of the press.
It is of crucial importance to keep clearly in mind that neither the press nor the
petitioners were named in the protective or seal orders, that they were not subject
to their terms ....
[T] he trial court does not have a duty to consult with the press or to allow them representation at hearings regarding whether or not to disclose evidence
prior to trial.
Id. at 208-09, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (when the Government exercises its power to exclude an alien on the basis of
a facially legitimate reason, the courts will not test the exercise of that discretion by
balancing its justification against the 1st amendment interests of those seeking personal
communication with the applicant); Allegrezza v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d
948, 121 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1975), quoted in Rosato v. Superior Court, supra at 208,
124 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
72. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976); TimesPicayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974).
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and uninhibited press, especially when the conflict arises from a judgemade order. Therefore, before a trial court can coerce disclosure of a
newsman's confidential sources, the need for disclosure must (1) override and subordinate the first amendment interest, and (2) be substantially connected to the information sought. 73 In the Farrcase, this twopronged 74 test was not met: the fair trial interest failed to meet the
second criterion, and the need for judicial enforcement did not fulfill
the first. Nevertheless, the court upheld a burdensome restraint on the
press without the justification of a compelling judicial interest. Although recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege, the court,
when confronted with an opportunity to evolve meaningful postBranzburg guidelines on the scope thereof, failed to verbalize the
newsman's interests that were to have been balanced against the opposing need for disclosure. This sub silentio dismissal of the first
amendment issues, together with the court's uncritical analysis of the
opposing need, suggests that the newsman's privilege is not healthy in
the Ninth Circuit.
Brian A. Morrison

73. This is merely a reaffirmation of the rule implemented by the Ninth Circuit
court in Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), and applied in the
context of a newsman's privilege in United States v. Liddy. 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 39 supra.
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